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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--ooOoo--




FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
--ooOoo--
Case No. 10942 
Appeal from a Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff 
granted by the Fourth District Court in and for 
Wasatch County, Allen B. Sorenson, Judge, Pre-
siding. 
--ooOoo--
NATURE OF THE CASE 
' ., 
This is an action by automobile deale~ 
Respondent SPENCER AUTO SALES, INC., to collect·' 
in excess of $12,000 held by Appellant FIRST 
SECURITY BANK in a reserve account pertaining 
to conditional sales contracts sold to the Bank 
by the Dealer pursuant to a Dealer's Reserve 
Agreement. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Allen B. Sorenson, Judge, granted Plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment after a hearing on 
the matter and judgment in favor of Plaintiff-
Respondent was subsequently entered against 
Defendent-Appellant on May 1, 1967, in the 
amount of $12,254.07 with interest. A second 
hearing reconsidering the motion resulted in 
no change of the decision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judg-
ment of the District Court and instruction that 
judgment for Defendent-Appellant be entered, 
or in the alternative, remanded for further 
proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The undisputed relevant facts commence 
in time on July 29, 1965, when the parties 
entered into an "Auto Dealer Protection and 
Reserve Agreement" (referred to hereinafter as 
"Reserve Agreement," and shown twice at R. 10-
11 and R. 43, Exhibit 2). Pursuant to the 
Reserve Agreement Appellant Bank regularly 
purchased retail conditional sales contracts 
from Respondent Dealer until May, 1966, (R. 31,: 
' ., 
lines 7-12) , and one additional contract was 
purchased in July, 1966, (R. 34, lines 21-28)., 
It had originally been thought that the Reserv 
Agreement specifically made the subject of thi 
action was in effect until October 21, 1966 
(R. 7) , but this date was subsequently clari- : 
fied to the May date in the deposition of Byro 
Cheever (R. 28-31) , and by additional corres-
pondence between counsel which is not in the 
record. 
During the regular course of busines 
the Bank paid the Dealer the face amount of 
each contract purchased less an amount of dis-' 
count previously agreed upon, which amount 
was placed in a "Reserve" account held by the 
Bank as security for the Dealer's recourse 
guaranty and other obligations provided in the 
Reserve Agreement. While the parties were thu. 
doing business and the Dealer was not in defau 
in any manner, the Bank paid the Dealer, at th 
end of each quarter, the funds in the reserve 
account in excess of five percent (5%) of the 
aggregate outstanding contracts held by the 
Bank under the Agreement. A "special" reserve 
account was also established for specific 
problematical contracts but is not in issue 
here. After May, 1966, when the Dealer 
took its business elsewhere, the Bank con-
tinued to hold all accumulated reserves becau: 
of the substantial volume of contracts still 
.: 
outstanding. 
On August 5, 1966, the Dealer wrote 
a letter presumably constituting a demand for 
the amount of reserves exceeding five percent 
(5%) (R. 43, Exhibit 1) .and on January 9, 
1967, a more formal demand for the reserves 
was made (R. 43, Exhibit 4). Shortly prior 
to the first demand, at the period ending 
June 20, 1966, the Bank held reserves in the 
amount of $24,236.71, constituting 7.6% of 
the outstanding retail contracts of $319,025.· 
(R. 43, Exhibit 5). Shortly prior to the 
January demand, at the period ending November 
1966, the reserve amounted to $19,730.06 con-
stituting 9.07% of the outstanding retail 
contracts of $206,422.93 (R. 43, Exhibit 6). 
Subsequent to filing the present action, and 
at the period ending March 20, 1967, the rese: 
amountAd to $18.908.22, constituting 13.404% 
of the outstanding retail contracts totaling 
$141,067.23 (R. 43, Exhibit 7). By this 
action Plaintiff-Respondent seeks recovery 
of all amounts in the gene~al reserve account 
exceeding five percent (5%) of the outstanding,: 
balances of the retail c::?ntracts, with interes·: 
from the respective dates of demand. 
Notwithstanding the Dealer's actions 
terminating the business relationship as of 
May, 1966, and at least no later than July, 
1966, the Reserve Agreement was not formally 
terminated by the Bank until this litigation 
was pending and on April 11, 1967, (R. 15). 
The entire dispute of the parties involves 
interpretation of the Reserve Agreement and 
specifically paragraph 4. thereof. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ITS CONTRAC 
TUAL INTERPRETATION REQUIRING REFUND OF THE 
EXCESS RESERVES. 
In the interest of clear exposition 
of issues to be decided on appeal Appellant 
moves at the outset to consideration of legal 
questions arising from the contractual provi-
-6-
sions. Paragraph 4. provides in pertinent 
part: 
***The Dealer's Reserve Account is 
hereby assigned and pledged to the 
Bank and shall be held and controlled 
by the Bank as a continuing security, 
for all of the Dealer's obligations 
to, and agreements with, the Bank, 
now or hereafter existing, absolute 
or contingent. ***When and if this 
agreement is terminated, and when 
all of the Dealer's direct and con-
tingent obligations to the Bank 
shall have been paid, satisfied and 
discharged, the balance then remain-
ing in the Dealer's Reserve Account 
shall be released to the Dealer by 
the Bank. On the last day of March, 
June, September, and December the 
Bank, on written demand of the 
Dealer, and if at such time the 
Dealer is not in default on any of 
the Dealer's obligations to the 
Bank and this Agreement is still in 
effect, shall release to the Dealer 
out of the Dealer's Reserve Account, 
the amount by which the credit bal-
ance in the Dealer's Reserve Account 
shall, at the date of payment, exceed 
five percent of the total balances 
then unpaid on the Dealer's Contracts 
held by the Bank under this Agreement. 
(Emphasis supplied) (R. 10 and R. 43, 
Exhibit 2) 
The final paragraph on Page 2 of the 
Agreement provides: 
This agreement may be terminated 
at any time by either par~y upon 
notice to the other, provided, 
however, that such termination . 
shall not affect any contract dis-
counted under this agreement. 
Analysis of most of the quoted 
provisions is fairly simple. The reserve 
account is held as continuing security for 
all of the Dealer's obligations, both absolute 
and contingent. The Bank is clearly obligated,:' 
however, to refund quarterly all reserve funds: 
exceeding five percent (5%) of the aggregate 
outstanding contracts, not on the capricious 
whim of the Bank, but on the existence of i! 
two conditions precedent: (1) the Dealer 
is not in default on any obligations to the 
. Bank, and (2) the Agreement is still in 
1 • 
effect. It was conceded that at least as of 
April 7, 1967, Respondent Dealer was not 
in default on any obligations to the Bank 
(R. 26, lines 5-12). But the real question 
in this entire litigation is whether the 
Agreement is still in effect, for the purposes 
of that last sentence of paragraph 4. 
The Agreement clearly would not be 
in effect if, as specifically provided in the 
middle of paragraph 4., all of the Dealer's 
absolute and contingent obligations were paid 
and discharged. This means that no further 
contracts are outstanding and Dealer has 
fully performed what it was obligated to 
perform. In such a circumstance the Dealer 
receives back all of the reserve account and 
not only that exceeding five percent (5%). 
The Agreement clearly would not be 
in effect if either party served a written 
and formal notice of termination of contract. 
Appellant Bank, out of prudence and a desire 
to eliminate any further question about future 
demands by Respondent Dealer, gave such formal 
notice April ll, 1967. (R. 15) Of prime impor-1 
tance for this Court to consider, however, is 
the reservation in the last sentence of the 
Agreement that even if notice of termination 
has been given the Agreement still controls 
as to any contracts remaining outstanding. 
The only effect of a notice of termination, 
therefore, is an announcement that the Dealer 
will not sell further contracts to the Bank, 
or, in the event of notice from the Bank, that 
the Bank will not purchase further contracts 
submitted. This puts the parties in the 
unique status of having no further business 
relationship because the contract is terminatec 
but its provisions still govern with respect 
to remaining outstanding contracts. If an 
automobile purchaser defaults in monthly pay-
ments the Bank may repossess the vehicle and 
require the Dealer to buy back the entire 
contract under the provisions of paragraph 5. 
That very provision constitutes the basis of 
the Dealer's contingent obligations to the 
Bank. Until such contingent obligations are 
discharged by payment of all contracts out-
standing the Bank may hold the entire reserve 
account as security for all absolute or 
contingent liabilities of the Dealer and is 
not obligated to pay the reserves down to the 
five percent (5%) figure because one of the 
conditions precedent for such obligation is 
not fulfilled, to-wit: the Agreement is not 
11 still in ef feet. 11 
Appellant submits that it requires 
no stretch of either legal reasoning or 
language interpretation to say that the Agree-
ment is not "in effect" for the purposes of 
doing business, but yet governs while any 
contracts remain outstanding with the Bank. 
It exists for one purpose, but not for another 
Indeed, such construction is absolutely neces-
sary if the phrase "Agreement is still in 
effect" has any meaning whatever. It can 
be reduced to this simp~e thr~~ stage anafysis 
~ 
(a) If the parties are doing business and 
Dealer is not in default he is clearly de-
serving of the reserves down to the five 
percent (5%) figure; (b) If the parties are 
no longer doing business, the contracts are 
fully paid and the Dealer is not in default, 
the Dealer is paid all:of the reserve account: 
(c) If the parties are no longer doing 
business, but contracts yet remain outstandin~ 
then the Agreement is not "in effect" but 
the Bank is entitled to hold the entire 
reserve account as security for Dealer's 
contingent liabilities. Only in this "middle 
ground" between the status of fully paid con-
tracts and the status of a fully operative 
relationship does the phrase "if this Agree-
ment is still in effect" have any meaning, 
for the Dealer receives all his money in the 
-11-
first instance, receives down to the five 
percent (5%) figure in the second instance, 
but receives nothing in the last instance, whic 
is this present case. 
Examination of the record brings a 
ready answer to the rhetorical question: "On 
what ground does the Bank claim the Agreement 
is no longer in effect?" We base that asser-
tion on the simple fact that Respondent Dealer 
1-' 
unilaterally and voluntarily and without cause 
told the Bank in May, 1966, that it was think- : 
ing of taking its business elsewhere, and exce1~ 
for one July contract purchase, actually did 
just that. (R. 29, line 1, through R. 31, 
line 12) Appellant submits that the threat 
of discontinuing an established business patte1 
followed shortly by the actual discontinuance,, 
constitutes notice of termination of the contr< 
just as effectively as if a formal document ha< 
been served. In this connection reference is . 
again made to the last paragraph of the: Agree-! 
ment allowing termination by "either party upo1 
notice to the other. 11 No particular form of n<r 
is required. It may be oral or written. 
(We observe that when the contract requires 
written notice it so specifies, as in the 
case of the Dealer's demand for quarterly 
release of the reserves under paragraph 4.) 
What notice can be more effective, even if 
not lawyer-like formally documented, than 
for Mr. Spencer to tell the Bank he was no 
longer going to do business and then fulfill 
his promise or carry out his threat, as the 
case may be, by his objective behavior? 
No doubt can exist for this Court that as 
a result of Respondent Dealer's actions the 
Agreement was not "in effect" and Appellant 
Bank was not obligated to release the reserves 
exceeding the five percent (5%) figure. 
Because of the necessity of inter-
preting the contract specifically at issue 
in this case abundant citation of cases does 
not prove helpful. A few judicial decisions 
and the reasoning thereof, though not strictly 
apposite, may nevertheless serve to sustain 
our conclusions by analagous precedent and 
k l • to illumine the "fairness" of the Ban s posi-
--
tion in what might, at first glance, seem 
a harsh manner of treating a former customer. 
In Associate Discount Corp. vs. Goetzinger 
(Iowa 1954) 62 N.W. 2d 191, the dealer, 
Mickel, sold contracts for face value less 
a holdback ref erred to as "commission, 11 
repayable by the financing institution after 
each contract was fully paid. Though 
principally concerned with a question of holde: 
in due course the following is very meaningful: 
Mickel's commission on loans was 
not payable until 'these contracts 
were paid out.' It is a fair in-
ference one reason for witholding 
the commission on each loan was to 
insure Mickers continued interest 
and cooperation in connection with 
such loan. {62 N.W. 2d, 193) 
Similarly, in Mutual Finance Co. 
v. Martin (Fla. 1953) 63 So. 2d 649, it was 
stated that the amount held back from the con- 1 
tract purchase price upon assignment from the 
dealer to the financing institution.is "to 
protect the finance company against loss on t'b 
note" (63 so. 2d, 653). It is otherwise 
phrased in Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp. 
(Ark. 1952) 247 s. w. 2d 1, where "The agree-; 
ments for reserve, and for the so-called rese1 
were according to a pattern of intent showing 
mutuality of interests" (247 s. w. 2d, 5). 
Such policy considerations are vital in view-
ing the status between First Security Bank 
and Spencer Auto Sales in the case at bar. 
A mutuality of interest existed while the 
parties were operating harmoniously, for one 
party wanted the other to buy contracts, the 
other wanted to buy and also wanted to insure 
the first party's continued interest and cooper' 
ation in connection with each contract. Under 
such circumstances a reserve of only five 
percent (5%) of the aggregate outstanding 
contracts was sufficient to protect the Bank. 
But after the Dealer takes it upon himself to 
terminate the relationship the attitudes 
change, for then each party wants to look 
out for his own interests and no longer desires 
to maintain the mutuality of interests or 
"continuing-business" oriented kind of behavior; 
From the viewpoint of the Bank its possibility 
of loss is considerably increased by the loss 
of friendly cooperation of the Dealer. In 
the event of default by a contract debtor 
the Dealer has none of the former psycholo-
gical motivation to repurchase the contract 
and maintain harmony with the Bank, for the 
Dealer knows the Bank has the reserves to covex 
his obligations so why should he take any 
money out of his own pocket just to abide 
by an Agreement no longer in effect? To 
charge the reserve account for the repurchase 
commitments would be so natural a request by 
the Dealer that the Bank should be entitlErlto 
hold more funds than before. In the instant 
case Appellant Bank held contracts totaling 
$141,067.23 as late as March 20, 1967 (R. 43, 
Exhibit 7) , and three days later at least 
twenty-two (22) contracts out of the 127 out-
standing were past due, some of them for· a 
considerable length of time (R. 43, Exhibit 8). 
In view of the possible lack of continued 
cooperation of the Dealer, the Court cannot 
say that the Bank is being unreasonably 
Protected or has an excess of consideration 
for its increased risks by retaining the entire 
reserve account until all contracts are fully 
paid. Precisely this kind of risk on contin-
gent liabilities of the Dealer is envisioned 
by the Reserve Agreement and the conditions 
precedent to the Bank's obligation to release 
any reserves. And if the present Agreement is 
not worded quite as artfully as we would hope 
it will be changed for future transactions, 
but even in its present state the language 
is clear enough, as applied to the facts of 
the case, to justify this Court in reversing 
the judgment of the Court below. 
The strength of a reserve account 
as a separate source of security is shown 
when a financing institution can be deemed 
a holder in due course of the assigned contrac~ 
even when it retains a five percent (5%) re-
serve for losses. Implement Credit Corp. v. 
Elsinger (1954) 208 Wis. 143, 66 N. W. 2d 657. 
And more convincingly, the purpose and integri· 
of a dealer's reserve is manifest in Tallant v 
Hamilton (Mo. 1966) 406 s. w. 2d 599. In 
that case· the dealer discontinued doing busine, 
with the financing agency and subsequently sue1 
for the reserves which had been held back from 
the contract purchase price during the period 
of assigning contracts in the ordinary course 
of business. The Court held that since the 
reserve account was for the purpose of protect-· 
ing the financer from credit losses, it was 
entitled to the full amount in the reserve 
account up to the amount of its notes from 
the dealer, less the value of money or proper-
ty actually received by it from the dealer, 
as adjusted by costs of repossession of the 
vehicles. That case arose at a point in the 
dissolved relationship which was further "down 
the road" than the case at bar. But the reserv 
account can and must be maintained by Appellant 
Bank for the manifest purpose of protecting 
it against possible losses of the nature 
actually suffered in the cited cases. With 
twenty-two (22) out of 127 contracts (17.3%) 
past due as of March 23, 1967, and thus 
subject to possible repurchase demand against 
the Dealer, it is not at all unreasonable that 
the Bank should continue to hold reserves 
amounting to 13.404% of the outstanding contrac 
(R. 43, Exhibits 7 and 8). It is thus sub-
mitted that both the wording of the Agreement 
and a fairly inferred policy behind the Agree-
ment compel this Court to reverse the decision 
of the lower Court. 
In referring to the first Memorandum 
Decision of the lower Court (R. 45) it should 
be noted that we are not urging, nor does any 
need exist therefor, any express or implied 
stipulation in the Agreement amending the 
last sentence of paragraph 4. What Appellant 
urges does not amend but specifically gives 
meaning to that sentence and the entire Agree-
ment in which it finds its setting. 
POINT II: SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER IN 
VIEW OF UNRESOLVED FACTUAL ISSUES 
The arguments set forth above, rest-
ing primarily on the contract wording, are 
deemed sufficient legal basis for reversing 
the lower Court's judgment. If This Court 
does not adopt Appellant's attempts to give 
meaning to the words "if this Agreement is 
still in effect," in the context of the support 
I ~ 
,'· 
I : .I 
J 
ing facts in the record showing effective 
termination, such decision can be based only 
on the assumption that the Agreement was still 
in effect when demands for the excess reserves 
were made by Respondent. For either the Agree-
ment continued in effect and the Bank was 
rendered obligated thereby to release reserves 
down to the five percent figure, or the Agree-
ment was not in effect and the Bank was therer 
relieved of such obligation until all contracts 
were paid off. No alternative positions are 
possible. And if the Agreement were deemed to 
have continued in effect, contrary to the legal 
arguments under Point I, then the record of 
this case must be shown to contain factual 
issues bearing thereon which render Summary 
Judgment completely inappropriate. This Court 
too well understands, to eliminate any need 
for extensive citations, the provisions of 
Rule 56 (c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
the effect that summary Judgment can be grantee 
only when no material issue of fact exists and 
a party is entitled to judgment as a matter _of 
--
law. At the first hearing on RespJndent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment the factual issue 
of termination was argued by Appellant.• s 
counsel to be the only issue for decision. 
For what was intended when Respondent's Mr. 
Spencer advised the Bank that he "had seriously 
considered changing his financing connection"? 
(R. 30, lines 26-28) And when Mr. Spencer 
actually did make a change, and discontinued 
selling contracts to First Security, did he 
intend to terminate the relationship with 
First Security or was he merely opening up 
another line of financing with the hope of 
using both financing institutions as outlets 
for his retail paper, as is often done by 
dealers? {R. 33, lines 7-11) We don't have 
Mr. Spencer's story in the record, other than 
his affidavit that his company was not in 
default. {R. 6) Although the record is clear 
that Mr. Spencer threatened to leave First 
Security on May 20, 1966, {R. 29, line 20), 
and only one contract was purchased by the 
Bank as late as July, 1966, {R. 34, lines 21-
28) yet were those circumstances sufficient 
to constitute notice to First Security that 
Spencer was terminating the Reserve Agree-
ment prior to his demand letter of August s, 
1966 (R. 43, Exhibit l)? And when the Bank's 
Mr. Cheever describes tlematter as a series 
of events leading up to his conclusion that 
Spencer was through doing business with the 
Bank, and that this had certainly become clear 
by October 21, 1966, (R. 34, line 15, through 
35, line 14,) is there room to believe that 
the parties had a fully effective Agreement 
at the time of the August 5th demand by Spencer. 
but had no such Agreement by the time of the 
next demand in January, 1967? The answers 
to these questions would be largely factual 
determinations bearing on the effectiveness 
and timing of the termination of the Reserve 
Agreement, if any. And with such issues in the 
record the summary Judgment was completely out 
of order. Thus an effective alternative ground 
is presented for reversing, and in this event 
remanding the case for further proceedings. 
-- -22c_~~------............. . 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the better reasoning 
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the 
undisputed facts evidence an effective termin-
ation of the Reserve Agreement by actions of 
Respondent, thus relieving Appellant of any 
obligation to release reserves from the account. 
The Judgment should be reversed with directions 
to enter Judgment for Defendant-Appellant. 
If the facts in the record cannot be f airl 
construed to support the termination theory, 
at least an issue of fact is :r:aised thereby whic 
requires reversal of the Judgment and remand for 
further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
